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Urban Informality as a Commons Dilemma
Sheila R. Foster*
I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of informal housing settlements on the
outer periphery of cities in the developing world is by now well
known, popularized in part by movies like City of God' and by
books like Planet of Slums 2 and Shadow Cities.3 The buying and
selling of land in these settlements takes place largely outside of
formal housing markets and formal planning and land use
processes. An informal market and its accompanying norms fuel
what is now regarded as the predominant mode of urbanization in
much of the developing world's metropolitan cities.4
Informal settlements in Latin America ("barrios piratas" or
"colonias illegales"), particularly, have varied origins. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that most informal settlements in Latin Ameri-
can cities are not "squatter settlements" involving the invasion by
potential inhabitants of privately held land.5 Rather, they have
sprung from subdivisions in which a "pirate" developer or land
speculator acquires a relatively large piece of "raw" or unserviced
* Albert A. Walsh Professor of Law, Fordham University. I am grateful to Colin
Crawford and Daniel Bonilla for exposing a group of lawyers and scholars (including
myself) to the city of Bogota, its history, and its remarkable growth and
transformation in so many areas over recent years. I also thank my colleagues at
Fordham Law School for reading and providing insightful comments and questions on
this piece. I extend special thanks to Caroline Gentile, Eduardo Pefialver, Aaron
Saiger, and Katherine Strandburg for their time and wisdom in helping me think
through the difficult issues posed herein. Finally, I am grateful to Jacob Press for
expert research assistance. All mistakes and errors are my own.
1. CITY OF GOD (Miramax Films 2002).
2. MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS (Verso 2006).
3. ROBERT NEUWIRTH, SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATrERS, A NEW URBAN
WORLD (Routledge 2005).
4. A similar phenomenon exists along the United States border with Mexico.
Colonias are informal settlements located on former farm and ranching land in
unincorporated rural areas in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. It is
estimated that about half a million people live in these settlements. Colonias are
strikingly similar to informal settlements in Latin America and the rest of the
developing world except that most colonia settlements are extra-legal rather than
illegal. They exist in the absence of building codes and other land use regulations. See
generally Jane Larson, Informality, Illegality and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV.137 (2000); Jane Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J.
179 (1995).
5. See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 40-41.
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urban land (usually on the periphery of a large city like Bogotd
and often on previously agricultural land) and subdivides it for
resale to low-income purchasers.6 Although they are not settled
by invasion of others' property, many of the homes will often lack
properly registered title deeds to the property.'
These subdivided settlements are "illegal" primarily in the
sense that they do not conform to local land use planning or regu-
latory controls (e.g. zoning and building codes, subdivision regula-
tions) and lack basic urban infrastructure and services-amongst
those water, electricity, sewage systems. Over a relatively short
period of time, migrants come to these subdivisions, purchase lots
of land, build houses on their respective plots, manage to acquire
connections to the water, sewage, and other essential services nec-
essary to create a functioning neighborhood.' What is striking is
6. "[Tlhe pirate subdivider will first obtain a relatively large piece of raw land.
The property is then bulldozed to establish the street pattern, and stakes or other
markings are driven to indicate the boundaries of specific lots. A small sales office is
established near the site, generally consisting of one room equipped only with a desk
and a plot plan of the subdivision." William A. Doebele, The Private Market and Low
Income Urbanization: The "Pirate" Subdivisions of Bogota, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 531,
536 (1977); see also Alexander Nifio Ruiz, Formal and Informal Housing Practices in
Bogota, Colombia: The Experience of Metrovivienda and Juan XXIII, 36 REVISTA DE
DERECHO PRIVADA 183, 188 (2006).
7. In some cases, the speculators who sell the land do not legally own it in the
first place, but this is not the most common scenario. Some subdividers, for example,
sold land to which they lacked formal legal title. Compounding the problem is that
often people would resell the plots to others, sometimes selling them up to ten times,
creating a tremendous amount of legal uncertainty. See Daniel Bonilla Maldonado,
Legal Pluralism and Extra-legal Property, Class, Culture and Law in Bogotd, 8-9,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/humanrights/publications/Bonilla Ext
ralegal%20Property.pdf. Despite this uncertainty however, many barrio residents
end up owning their land either through local government's regularization program or
by negotiating directly with private owners. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, MURRAY L.
SCHWARTZ & AUDREY J. SCHWARTZ, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW IN THE BARRIOS OF
CARACAS 17 (1973); Alan Gilbert, On The Mystery of Capital and the Myths of
Hernando De Soto: What Difference Does Legal Title Make?, 24 INT'L DEv. PLANNING
REV. 1, 6 (2002).
8. One account of a newly arrived purchaser, Rosa Martinez, to the barrio
Jerusaldn, Ciudad Bolivar on the outskirts of Bogota, recounts a fairly typical process
of how newcomers purchase and construct their houses on plots of subdivided land:
Our plot had 7 mts. x 14 mts.; at the time, the people who sold land
would measure them with strings, and all the plots had the same
size, 7 x 14 .... And when we came to see it for the first time, when I
came with my children, it was terrible. I didn't expect this hill.
There was no transportation .... There was no water, no electricity,
no roads, no access, and no people. When we arrived, there were
only two small houses, those of the watchmen. Jerusal6n was a dry
hill, completely dry, with huge cracks, with impressive streams.
There was a lot of maguey, which is, let's say, the original tree in
Jerusaldn, and chilco. That was it .... [L]ater, my partner found a
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that the way in which these settlements are subdivided-into uni-
form lots with conventional street patterns-can make them seem
indistinguishable from a formal, planned subdivision.9
Purchasers of the land are really "possessors" and not owners
of their plots, even though they often acquire the land under some
"color of title." The subdivider may hold a conventional title but
the purchasers who take possession of the subdivided lots do so by
way of an informal mortgage "note," a promesa de compraventa (a
promissory note), in which they promise to make installment pay-
ments with interest with the expectation of receiving a recordable
title at the end of the payment period. 10 Nevertheless, as others
job and there they gave him some materials: some wood, some
planks, and we started to work every Sunday; we would all come as
in a procession and we began to build a little hut .... There was
only one room, which served as living room, bedroom, kitchen,
everything. Even as [a] workshop. The soil was not treated. There
were no excavations, no bases, nothing. One would arrive and just
live there. And the carpet... well, the grass was the carpet. Eh!
That was for taking possession.
We arrived in 1982, after coming up here and building for a year.
When we arrived, there were already many houses .... That same
year, 1982. . .something like the business center of the
neighborhood was built.
Bonilla, supra note 7, at 5-6; see also Ruiz, supra note 6, at 195 (describing the efforts
of settlers who organized themselves to provide open rain systems and sewage
collectors" and "acquired illegal connections form the city's power and water systems,
which was provided to the formal high-income neighborhoods surrounding them.").
9. DAvis, supra note 2, at 41. Also, as Rosa Martinez notes about the subdividers
who helped settle Jerusal~n:
The "Sociedad Urbanistica del Sur" was organized; they did not just
come here. They commissioned a topographic study of the land,
divided the blocks and left room for parks. People did not just come
and build as they pleased. No. Now I see it: there is a design, a
blueprint, where the blocks stand very much like Manhattan,
right? They are very well ordered, very well ordered. The streets
were wide, there were parks, it was well designed. Obviously, the
urban planners did not live here; they had watchmen in charge of
sales.
Bonilla, supra note 7, at 8.
10. See, e.g., Doebele, supra note 6, at 533. One example where the subdividers did
not hold formal title is from a first person account of the settlement of Jerusaldn,
Ciudad Bolivar on the outskirts of Bogota, contained in a fascinating paper by Daniel
Bonilla. In it, the narrator explains that:
The plots being sold were part of the Hacienda Casablanca. The
owners of the estate... were people from the Gaviria family. The
Gaviria family had abandoned this land; it was not occupying it;
they only had a watchwoman, Dona Noemi Rios, who was supposed
to take care of the whole estate. According to Mrs. Noemi, the
Gavirfa family never paid her a salary, benefits or anything for the
twenty, thirty years she looked over the land... and then Dona
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have written, despite the informal means through which they
obtain their property the new inhabitants enjoy a security of ten-
ure that is not dependent upon formal title to the property.1 As
one commentator has said, "[mlany of these illegal forms of land
development provide the occupiers with plots from which they will
never be removed .... Most purchasers of land in illegal subdivi-
sions know perfectly well that they are the owners from the day
that they pay their deposit to the illegal sub-divider. Such owners
proceed with the building of their house unconcerned about the
dangers of eviction."12
Informal settlements represent a form of "self-help" that
enables poor families to secure decent housing at a time when
many Latin American cities are exploding and expanding with
new immigrants. 3 This urban "self help," or urban informality,
arises out of the failure of both the market and the government to
provide an important or essential urban service, here affordable
housing. The influx of new (and often global) capital and increased
competition for scarce resources creates tremendous demand for
affordable housing in major Latin American cities, pushing the
borders of the city increasingly to the outer periphery. Both the
subdividers and the purchasers of these subdivided plots are in a
sense rationally responding to very high entry barriers to formal
housing markets and transaction costs generated by cumbersome
or inappropriate land use regulations.14
Noemi met with some lawyers, Mr. Calvo and Mr. Carvajal, and
some twenty more individuals and created a company called
"Sociedad Urbanizado del Sur." These twenty individuals came and
divided the estate among them. Each one of them had a part, and
each would sell his or her plots.
Bonilla, supra note 7, at 8.
11. See, e.g., Omar M. Razazz, Examining Property Rights and Investment in
Informal Settlements: The Case of Jordan, 69 LAND ECON. 341, 349 (1993)
("[E]mpirical evidence points to a continuum of security in illegal settlements that
depends less on the exact legal status and more on occupant's perceptions of the
probability of eviction and demolition (enforcement); as well as the availability of
services and the passage of time.").
12. Gilbert, supra note 7, at 6-7 (noting the vulnerability of informal settlements,
in practice, varies considerably and depends on a multitude of factors including the
identity of the original owner, the location of the land, the alternative uses of the land,
the nature of the government and whether or not an election is near).
13. Ruiz, supra note 6, at 185-87.
14. See, e.g., Doebele, supra note 6, at 533 ("[Blecause the legal framework
regulating the subdivision of land in such countries normally addresses itself to the
problem of establishing middle and high-income housing, its standards, both as to lot
layout and the provision of complete services, is totally inappropriate to the needs of
low-income housing."); Bruce Ferguson & Jesus Navarrete, A Financial Framework
for Reducing Slums: Lessons from Experience in Latin America, 15 ENV'T &
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The question this short essay asks is: how do, or can, we
understand the phenomenon of urban informality within a larger
framework so as to reason about the choices it presents govern-
ment and policymakers as they struggle to manage urban growth,
development, and transformation in Latin American metropolitan
cities? The contention of this essay is that the problem of urban
informality presents in some ways a classic "commons" problem.
The framework that I offer here casts the commons problem in the
context of informal settlements as in part created by "regulatory
slippage," a term I invoke to mean the marked decline or move-
ment away from preexisting levels of management or control of
the urban commons (over which public authorities have formal
governing authority). Regulatory slippage creates the opportunity
for self-interested behavior over a resource (or resources) whose
access and use was previously limited (at least in theory) by regu-
latory control.
Zoning and other land use regulations manage many aspects
of the urban environment like a commons. Land use regulations
are aimed in large part at controlling and managing those tangi-
ble and intangible aspects of the urban environment in which
urban residents share a common stake-e.g. shared open space,
infrastructure, local amenities, and the quality of the physical
environment (e.g., air, water, noise levels). Land use regulations
do so by limiting how private landowners use their property as a
way of limiting the impacts of that use on the urban commons.
Once such regulatory control is loosened or sacrificed, as in the
case of informal settlement creation, it creates the conditions for
expanded access to and rivalry over those shared resources.
The commons problem in the urban context is in part a prob-
lem of open access to exhaustible resources and in part a problem
of local governance. During periods of regulatory slippage, the
issue of governance arises anew and should reopen the question of
how best to manage these resources against the demands placed
on them. That is, by looking closely at the reasons underlying the
creation of informal settlements, we can begin to reason about
those choices, taking into account the realities on the ground. The
analytical traction that the Tragedy of Commons offers is to allow
us to do so along the spectrum of public and private governance
choices and the tradeoffs that they entail. This essay explores
UR3ANIZATION 201, 205 (2003) (noting that "various studies have shown that
government regulations and formal and informal (bribe) charges in low- and middle-
income countries raise the end cost of housing substantially.").
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these choices, their tradeoffs, and offers some thoughts about each
in the context of informal settlements.
II. URBANIZING THE "TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS"
Although the commons has been a useful and persistent trope
through which to think about collective resource problems in the
natural resources context, it has less often been employed to think
through resource problems in the urban context and entrenched
urban problems such as affordable housing, urban sprawl/conges-
tion, and residential segregation/stratification. 5 We are accus-
tomed to thinking about the commons as natural, open access
collective resources like pastures, forests, fisheries and the like. In
the classic tale "The Tragedy of the Commons," Garret Hardin
warned of depletion of an open access, collective resource ("a pas-
ture open to all") where it is difficult to exclude potential users
and rational actors lack incentives to conserve or manage the
resource.16
Many urban resources share much with Hardin's conception
of the commons as a collective resource open to use by members of
a community and prone to overuse or degradation. In particular,
city or urban residents share access to a number of local tangible
and intangible resources in which they all share a common stake.
These resources range from local streets, schools, public accommo-
dations, infrastructure to neighborhood ambiance, aesthetics, and
the shared physical environment (including air quality and
noise). 7 The use, consumption, and management of these
resources also invoke the type of choices that Hardin and his intel-
lectual successors posed as solutions to management of the
commons.
15. But see generally Lee Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L.R.
1227 (2006); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE
L.J. 549 (2001); Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998); Bradley Karkkainen,
Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENV'L L. 45 (1994); Carol Rose, The
Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom and Inherently Public Property, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
16. See Garrett Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons," in MANAGING THE COMMONS
(John Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 2d ed. 1998).
17. Bradley Karkkainen refers to these collective resources as the "neighborhood
commons." "Rather than constituting a single clearly-defined resource, the
neighborhood commons is multidimensional, consisting of a web of sometimes-
overlapping and sometimes-unrelated resources that may be used in different
combinations... and some parts of which are 'open access' in that they may be used by
non-residents as well." Karkkainen, supra note 15, at 68 n.91.
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A. Regulatory Slippage and the Urban Commons
Open access land (such as an urban park or its streets and
sidewalks) is the most obvious analog to the commons metaphor in
the urban context. In the case of informal settlements, however, it
would be too convenient and most certainly inaccurate to describe
the land on which speculators create illegal subdivisions as a com-
mons. The land on which illegal subdivisions are built is privately
owned land and, as such, is subject to exclusion. The land is also
subject to restrictions on its use much like any other urban land
within the geographic and legal jurisdiction of the relevant munic-
ipal government. 8 Thus, although the land is open, vacant, and
often unguarded, legally it has restrictions on its use and develop-
ment in the form of zoning and other land use regulations.
Informal settlements are able to thrive in cities across the
world because, in spite of the existence of fairly well developed
planning and land use rules designed in part to limit its use and
manage its development/consumption, raw undeveloped land is
nevertheless "up for grabs" to speculators and ultimately to as
many settlers as the land can accommodate.19 The government's
inability (or unwillingness) to effectively manage land over which
it has exerted its jurisdiction creates the opportunity and the
incentive for overuse (or misuse) of the land, and thus represents
significant regulatory slippage. By regulatory slippage, I mean the
movement away from either enforced or voluntary compliance
with the restrictions on use of the resource in question (e.g. in this
case, subdivision and building requirements). Regulatory slip-
page can occur when oversight of formally regulated land or other
collective resources becomes too costly for the government, espe-
cially in a time of declining resources and when faced with an
overwhelming demand on those resources. 0
18. See, e.g., Doebele, supra note 6, at 545-46 (describing the regulation of
subdivisions in Bogota and other land use restrictions).
19. In the case of colonias, the land is even closer to the classic "open pasture" in
that it is completely unregulated. As Jane Larson argues:
Most colonia settlements are extra-legal rather than illegal. When
residents and developers created existing colonias, subdivision and
sale of rural land for residential construction without provision of
basic infrastructure or access to public services was lawful, and no
building codes set housing standards. Yet where the state fails to
regulate activities that in other settings are regulated according to
accepted patterns, a kind of informality develops, albeit one built
on legal and material nonconformity rather than illegality.
Larson, Informality, supra note 4, at 140.
20. Regulatory control over the commons may also decline as a result of a heavy
20091 267
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Consider an urban park whose quality declines dramatically
because the volume or character of use has changed significantly
and limiting or controlling such use begins to exceed government
resources.21 Or the quality of neighborhood amenities, such as
clean and safe streets, might begin to decline through an increase
in demands by different users and uses of its open access spaces-
such as in the case of excessive loitering or littering by visitors to
the neighborhood-over which the government has been able to
exercise little control. Lacking such management, the increase in
these uses of common space will eventually begin to rival if not
overwhelm other users and uses of the space.2"
In the case of informal settlements, the state/local govern-
ment (and its regulatory apparatus) has been overwhelmed by the
demand for low-income housing and the efforts by speculators to
meet that demand.23 The combination of lack of sanctions in the
regulatory system and the sheer rate of pirate development has
severely weakened the state and local government's ability to con-
influx of private capital which creates a government that is heavily dependent upon
private actors pursuing their own self-interests. Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick,
Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political Economy of Urban Development, 95
CAL. L. R. 1999, 2021 (2007) ("As cities grow increasingly dependent upon private
capital and resources and stymied by competition with other municipalities for those
resources, their leverage over developers has seriously declined, as has their ability to
control their social and economic destiny.").
21. As Elizabeth Blackmar convincingly argues in the case of Central Park in New
York City:
[I]n the aftermath of the fiscal crisis in New York, when public
agencies competed for severely restricted funds, taxpayers'
reluctance to pay for the labor necessary to maintain public space
offered a starkly visual iteration of a tragedy of commons in park
meadows turned to sand lots or recreational facilities abandoned to
arsonists. But the deteriorating condition of Central Park, for
example, was attributed as much to mismanagement that
permitted 'overuse' as an unregulated commons as to cutbacks in
its maintenance force.
Elizabeth Blackmar, Appropriating the Commons: The Tragedy of Private Rights
Discourse, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 71 (Selma Low & Neil Smith eds., 2006).
22. Such "chronic street nuisances," according to Robert Ellickson, will ultimately
require either a system of government control, enforcement of social norms through
criminal law, or some form of private governance of these spaces. Robert Ellickson,
Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and
Public Space Zoning, 105 YALE L. J. 1165 (1996).
23. Jieming Zhu, Commons and Anticommons: Role of the State in the Housing
Market, 11 (2005), http://www.worldbank.org/urban/symposium2005/papers/zhu.pdf
("When the supply from housing markets and public housing cannot meet the
demand, it is hard for the government to strictly implement planning control as rules
imposed on the self-built housing market which pursues the maximization of
individual interests.").
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trol and manage this form of urbanization.24 By flouting existing
zoning and land use regulations, both the subdividers and the
individual purchasers are in a sense recreating the commons
drama or tragedy. By de facto removing unappropriated land from
regulatory reach it reverts in practice back to its natural, unregu-
lated state where there is little or no restriction on its use.25
To be clear, regulatory slippage has no normative content; it
does not imply that there is some optimal level or regulation. It
only implies that the prevailing practice of land use has slipped
significantly away from the regulatory baselines and standards
that formally govern it. In fact, conscious regulatory slippage
might be a completely rational choice on part of the local govern-
ment. Why expend resources to manage or regulate unappropri-
ated land? If the land is not claimed or used productively, then the
oversight costs may have been wasted. On the other hand, if the
land is put to productive use-as in the case of informal settle-
ments-the benefits of then invoking oversight and regulation
(which are virtually absent when no one lives in the area) may be
greater than the costs of that regulation.
B. The Tragedy of Informal Settlements
Rational or not, regulatory slippage creates the conditions for
tragedy. As Hardin explained vis-A-vis the open pasture commons,
24. See, e.g., Doebele, supra note 6, at 545-47 (explaining the regulation of
subdivisions in Bogota, the weak sanctions for violating the regulations, and the lack
of administrative capacity to enforce the existing sanctions. "Since the pirate
subdivider suffered no sanctions from neglecting to obtain approvals, and could sell
his lots as quickly without them, he had no incentive to comply with even the [special
district] requirements and generally did not do so.").
25. Some would argue that the emergence and growth of informal settlements are
partly attributable to the high transaction costs of formal regulation (for both the
subdividers and the individual purchasers) that create the incentives for establishing
informal markets for collective goods The extra costs-i.e. lack of information, red
tape, waiting time-involved in complying with land use rules deter both subdividers
and individual purchasers from entering the formal housing market and make
building affordable housing too expensive to construct and purchase. See Ciro
Biderman, Martin Smolka, & Anna Sant'Anna, Urban Housing Informality: Does
Building and Land Use Regulation Matter?, LAND LiNEs, July 2008, at 14, 16 (citing
evidence from Brazil to support the proposition that poor households often choose
informal (untitled) houses over formal (titled) houses in response to regulations that
require additional costs or "credentials" to enter the formal market and/or reduce
design flexibility for house construction). Similarly, although the commons problem of
the colonias in the United States can be attributed to the lack of regulation (or under-
regulation, at the least), there is an argument to be made that these communities
actually came into being because the few regulations in place, such as building and
housing codes, were too onerous for those of limited means. See generally Larson, Free
Markets, supra note 4.
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individuals would rationally increase the number of cattle they
grazed on the commons in order to maximize their personal bene-
fit; the sum of rational individual strategies leads to the exhaus-
tion of the resource or resources held in common. Much like the
open green pasture depicted in Hardin's scenario unutilized (or
underutilized) land is accessible/available to individual users for
consumption (e.g. by speculators/pirate subdividers) where it
would be costly or difficult (if not impossible) to exclude them."
And much like the herdsman in Hardin's tragedy, in the case of
informal settlements, individual users (e.g. pirate subdividers)
have no incentive not to continue to (over) populate and consume
the land while externalizing the cost of that use to others.
As a result, urban land is being quickly consumed and its
availability is slowly disappearing. Moreover, the costs eventually
imposed on the local populace from the establishment and exis-
tence of informal settlements-i.e., the costs of upgrading, formal-
izing, and integrating the settlements into the urban metropolis-
might be better (or more efficiently) spread through a different
mechanism for using peripheral urban land to house the poor.
The cost of opportunistic (or rational) behavior by pirate subdivid-
ers is easy to externalize once the land is taken outside of the reg-
ulatory framework that is designed to capture and spread these
costs. While consumption of these lots is highly profitable for the
pirate subdivider, the subdivider ultimately externalizes the costs
of its consumption of the land onto others.27 It is ultimately the
public, the local government and its taxpayers who end up provid-
26. Although local officials have tried to do so by destroying buildings constructed
by the new settlers, their resources to do so have been largely outstripped by the
squatters/builders. See KARST ET AL., supra note 7, at 6-7 ("While some invasions are
tolerated and even encouraged by government officials, others are resisted by the
government to the point of destruction of the settlers' houses. It is not unusual to hear
of a squatter settlement that has been constructed overnight, torn down by the police
the next day, constructed again the following night, destroyed again, and
reconstructed until the authorities tire of fighting."); Bonilla, supra note 7, at 9 (Rosa
Martinez recounts that "[pleople would work all night, people would not stop, and
they had security committees because the Gavira family had filed a legal complaint
for illegal invasion of the.. .neighborhood. The police would come up, evict and burn
down the huts. . . .Then, in order to prevent this from happening, people started
staying inside. They began to organize.. .the children and pregnant women and put
them in the huts. After this, the policeman made an alliance with the sellers and
profited much from it .... They would.. filter information on roundups so that we
would know in advance.").
27. Another cost externalized by subdividers on the rest of the metropolitan area
is the public health and environmental hazard spillovers from the informal
settlements. See generally DAvis, supra note 2, at 122-42 (providing examples of both
naturally occurring and man-made externalities slum living creates).
270
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ing for the eventual provision of infrastructure and services, often
long after the subdivider has made its profits from the land.2s
For the individual purchasers, the cost of developing the land
(the short term provision of infrastructure and basis services) is
arguably part of the bargain of purchasing extremely low cost
housing. That is, to the extent the subdividers leave to the pur-
chasers the cost of providing this labor, the cost is captured in the
below market price of the land upon which the housing is built.
The cost that is more difficult to capture and account for is the
cost to taxpayers in the city or local government who eventually
pay for the "regularization"-upgrading the infrastructure and
basic services of informal settlements. Often after many decades
of incremental development, the city government will likely "regu-
larize" or legalize these neighborhoods (and individual plots) by
providing them with infrastructure." In some instances, the origi-
nal owners of the land may even encourage pirate subdivisions "in
the shrewd expectation that the state will be forced to guarantee
eventual compensation as well as infrastructural development."30
These costs can theoretically be captured through imposing taxes
and utility charges on the poor who inhabit these settlements,
assuming they can afford to pay them." Nevertheless, the pirate
subdivider's externalization of the cost of consumption of the
land-in the form of infrastructure improvements-on the local
government and its taxpayers is one that should be accounted for.
In addition to the consumption of urban land, a scarce
resource in most quickly developing parts of the world, informal
settlements place other common urban resources at risk of over-
28. As William A. Doebele nicely explains:
In the case of illegal subdividers, the easy part of urbanization is
obviously tracing of a street pattern and staking out lots. The costly
and difficult elements, namely the provision of services and the
construction of a dwelling, are passed on to the general public and
purchaser respectively. Thus-like certain sectors of U.S. industry
which have succeeded in externalizing the real social costs of
production into the public sector via pollution, congestion, hidden
subsidies, etc.-the illegal subdividers of Bogota have skimmed the
cream while successfully passing on the most serious costs and
intractable problems of the urbanization process.
Doebele, supra note 6, at 559.
29. See, e.g., Ruiz, supra note 6, at 188-91. In Bogota for example, the
administration of Enrique Pefialosa (1998-2000) formalized the provision of water,
electricity, and paved roads to 316 mostly low-income neighborhoods. See Ricardo
Montezuma, The Transformation of Bogota, Colombia, 1995-2000: Investing in
Citizenship and Urban Mobility, GLOBAL URB. DEV., May 2005, at 1, 2.
30. DAvis, supra note 2, at 40-41 (citing Buenos Aires as an example).
31. Id. at 80.
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consumption. Because these neighborhoods are located on the
periphery of existing cities, their distance makes it costly (and dif-
ficult) to provide them water, electricity and sewage infrastruc-
ture.32 The purchasers themselves will find creative, and illegal,
ways to acquire connections to municipal water, electricity and
sewage systems.3 3 These settlements also place additional, unac-
counted for demands on anarchic traffic patterns and collapsing
infrastructure in the metropolitan areas of which they are apart. 4
The cost of urban agglomeration-a patchwork of market rate
housing in the center city and informal settlements on the periph-
ery-may ultimately be the tragedy of the informal settlements.
III. LAND USE GOVERNANCE AND THE URBAN COMMONS
How might, or should, governing authorities respond to the
actions of individuals (or a group of individuals) who take advan-
tage of regulatory slippage by asserting some degree of control
over finite land and other urban resources? The analytical traction
or purchase that the tragedy of the commons metaphor offers in
this situation is to prod us to think anew about the best way to
approach this question along the public-private binary of govern-
ance approaches that Hardin and others have developed as a
response to the tragedy.
The tragedy of the commons problem has traditionally been
thought to require either a robust system of private property
rights in the commons (in which individual owners could most effi-
ciently internalize the costs imposed on the resource) or central
government command and control management approach (which
would constrain individual users by regulating the use and con-
32. See, e.g., Ruiz, supra note 6, at 191.
33. By not conforming to existing regulations, these areas are made vulnerable to
earthquakes and other natural disasters because of location (periphery) and how/
where houses are constructed. See id.
34. See DAvis, supra note 2, at 128-29 (analyzing slum ecology).
35. As one recent report argues:
Neglecting the cities also makes both firms and households more
vulnerable to the diseconomies of urban agglomeration-high costs
of land, congestion and inadequate mobility within the city, a
polluted environment, threats to the social order and to public
health, and crime. These risks, while never entirely avoidable with
population concentration, become greater and are prematurely
imposed by very inadequate urban management.
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sumption of the resource).36 A third approach has developed more
recently, which finds that in some instances the commons can be
self-regulated by users under certain conditions.37 Each of these
approaches pose their own distinct obstacles and costs and thus do
not presuppose a solution to the commons problem in every situa-
tion, and face particular obstacles when applied in the context of
informal settlements. As Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller have
aptly put it, "the problem of managing commons resources con-
cerns not only tragic outcomes, but also tragic choices: are we
doomed to choose between our liberal commitments and the eco-
nomic and social benefits available in a commons?"38
A. Government Regulation
In the urban context, central regulation has traditionally
been seen as the answer to the negative externalities and spil-
lovers generated by individual users of the commons. Zoning and
building regulations eliminate (or significantly reduce) negative
externalities by restraining individual users and increasing the
overall welfare of the commons. Central regulation is also the best
response, or a second best choice depending on your ideological
orientation, to the collective action/free rider problem that under-
lies the Tragedy. As Dan Tarlock has argued, the high transaction
costs of private actions to protect the urban commons from
overuse or degradation can pose an insurmountable obstacle to
collective private efforts.39 Lacking a solution to the free rider
problem, government is forced to "intervene through a zoning
ordinance to simulate the result that would have been accom-
plished had the initial landowners, but for high transaction costs,
been able to impose a covenant scheme on surrounding landown-
ers."40 Zoning creates new collective property rights that establish
positive incentives for building and maintaining attractive neigh-
borhood environments."
36. Hardin, supra note 16 at 213 ("[U]nder a system of private property the man of
group of men who own property recognize their responsibility to care for it, for if they
don't they will eventually suffer."). See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347-59 (1967).
37. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge University Press 1990).
38. Dagan, supra note 15, at 553.
39. Zoning can thus be justified because by itself "private collective actions fails to
provide sufficient quantities of a desired public good." A. Dan Tarlock, Toward a
Revised Theory of Zoning, 38 J. OF THE AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 145, 146 (1972).
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also Karkkainen, supra note 15, at 66 (Zoning is only partially about
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There are ways that a traditional regulatory approach can be
deployed to address the regulatory slippage that gives rise to the
ephemeral commons. The government might reduce the costs of
compliance with land use regulations,-e.g., streamlined
processes which require less waiting time, more flexible building
and other standards-reducing the incentives to shirk the system
altogether. El Salvador has been cited as an example of a govern-
ment reducing land-development standards and streamlining its
process as a way of lowering entry or upfront costs to developers of
affordable housing.42 Conversely, the government might ratchet
up its efforts to sanction those who attempt to exploit the
resources for individual gain-e.g., distributing parcels of land
but failing to provide services. Doing so would reduce the opportu-
nities for expanding access to the resource for those unwilling to
comply with the rules.
The centralized regulatory model ultimately faces significant
difficulties when applied to the tragedy of the commons in the
urban context. Any means of reasserting management or control
over the growth of informal settlements must account for the rea-
sons underlying regulatory slippage in the first place. The main
reason of the slippage is that the informal land market has
emerged in response to the lack of an adequate supply of afforda-
ble housing and the high transaction costs of entering the housing
market. Regulatory slippage creates its own brand of rational,
self-interested actors for whom regulation is neither a constraint
nor an incentive for compliance with its mandates. Unless regula-
tory reforms are aggressive enough to lower these costs and incen-
protecting individual property owners against the effects of "spillovers" or negative
externalities that adversely affect the market values of their property. Zoning in
urban neighborhoods protects both a homeowner's consumer surplus in their homes,
that lies above the market value of the home, as well as their interests in the
"neighborhood commons."); William Fischel, A Property Rights Approach to Municipal
Zoning, 54 LAND ECON. 64 (1978). See generally WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF
ZONING LAws: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS (John
Hopkins Press 1985).
42. Ferguson, supra note 14, at 205-06 explains that:
Before these reforms, government required full basic infrastructure
(electricity, individual water connections, individual sanitation,
drainage, paved roads) prior to sub-dividing. .... Now developers
need only lay out the sub-division (pegging out individual lots,
common facilities and roads) and provide basic water (standpipes),
sanitation (a latrine) and legal title. These changes have greatly
lowered up-front costs, allowed incremental upgrading of this
infrastructure, and stimulated a low-income development industry
that now accounts for over one-quarter of all new lots and housing
solutions in the country every year.
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tivize additional housing development, this self-interested
behavior will continue. Moreover, regulatory slippage often arises
because the demand for the resource far outstrips the govern-
ment's ability or capacity to exert effective control over it. The
result is that the sheer volume of settlers and settlements may
have gotten too big and too complex to be controlled by any single
central administrative authority.4"
B. Privatizing the Commons
It is no surprise that many Latin American cities have turned
to privatization solutions as a way of asserting control over, or
management of, informal settlements. This section will briefly dis-
cuss these solutions and the pitfalls encountered in trying to
address a complex problem with widespread social consequences.
There are two types of privatization solutions to the tragedy of the
commons onto which policies toward informal settlements map
themselves. The first is a private property solution; the second is a
market solution.44 Both force the decision maker and private par-
ties to account for the full social benefits and costs of their deci-
sions in order to reach an efficient use of the resource-e.g.
without externalities or spillovers. However, privatization solu-
tions can easily be frustrated and prove unworkable where they
cannot account for the full scope of externalities-e.g. all
resources affected by a private property owner or all those affected
by benefits and costs that flow from use of the resource.45
1. The Private Property Solution
The predominant response to informal settlement programs
in Latin America has been to "regularize" or "legalize" them by 1)
providing them with improved (or "upgraded") infrastructure and
public services-water systems, basic transportation and tele-
phone lines, etc.-often decades after their creation; and 2) by pro-
viding formal property titles to individual homes and their
possessors that occupy the settlements. 6 These two elements go
hand in hand in allowing the city to incorporate the growth of
43. See Doebele, supra note 6, at 561.
44. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private
Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533 (2007).
45. See id. at 555-65.
46. See, e.g., John J. Betancur, Approaches to the Regularization of Informal
Settlements: The Case of PRIMED in Medellin, Colombia, 3 GLOBAL URBAN DEV. 1
(2007), available at http://www.globalurban.org/GUDMagO7Vol3Issl/Betancur.htm
(describing the regularization program, its goals, successes, and failures).
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these settlements, physically and socially, into the city and to
ensure that residents occupy housing with well defined property
rights. But it is the second part of the solution, private property
rights, that is important here. This very DeSotian solution is
important for facilitating the selling and buying of property in the
formal market by those occupying illegal settlements.47 Doing so
allows individual homeowners to reap the full benefits of their
labor in constructing their home and building their community. It
also ensures that each homeowner internalizes the costs of their
occupation to the entire city; that is, the city can now recoup its
costs for infrastructure improvements both through payment for
the titles and through property taxes.48
The private property solution, however, is a fragile solution to
the costs imposed by the informal settlements on the government
and on the urban commons. First, on its own terms, establishing
formal property rights may not facilitate the occupants of informal
settlements to participate in the formal housing market to either
capture the benefits of home ownership or to fully internalize its
costs. As Alan Gilbert has found, evidence from Bogota, supported
by studies from other parts of the world, suggests that possession
of a legal title makes little or no difference to the availability of
formal finance.49 Although most self-help settlers now have legal
titles, they are not able to use their property as collateral for other
types of financing and wealth accumulation. This is in part due to
the location of their homes on the periphery of the cities in geo-
graphically risky and hazard-prone areas, and to the fact that
there is a limited (if nonexistent) resale market for these homes.5 °
Second, and more fundamentally, private property bounda-
ries should match (or encompass) the full scope of externalities or
47. See generally HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (Basic Books 2000).
48. Gilbert, supra note 12, at 5 ("The World Bank long ago recognized that the
profits made by a government agency could be used to finance other upgrading
programmes elsewhere.").
49. See id. at 9.
50. "In Bogota, perhaps the most serious problem facing formal lenders is not the
lack of legal title so much as the nature of the property on which the poor wish to
borrow money. Colombia's savings and loans corporations have strict rules about the
kinds of building and area on which they will advance loans. Even the socially
progressive Colmea 'red-line' certain areas of Bogota. Those who live in what are
considered to be risk zones will not get loans." Id. at 12; see also Peter Ward, Flavio
DeSouza & Cecilia Giusti, Colonia Land and Housing Market Performance and the
Impact of Lot Title Regularization in Texas, 41 URB. STUD. 2621-46 (2003) (suggesting
that titling does not improve the marketability of colonias properties because almost
no resale market exists at the bottom of the economic ladder).
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there will be leakage and externalities will remain. 1 Outside of a
pure consumption problem presented by Hardin's grass-eating
hypothetical-i.e., in which the cost was over consumption of
grass without any other impacts beyond its physical boundaries,
like air or water pollution for example-externalities and spil-
lovers are likely to remain when the private property solution is
applied to real world commons problems.2 Here, the overcon-
sumption of the land is only part of the tragedy. Rather, as noted
above, the costs of allowing unmanaged growth on the periphery
of urban cities is a full range of impacts imposed both on common
urban resources and on those who live outside of settlement
boundaries.
Granting well-defined property rights to the land occupiers
might allow them to recapture some of the costs of building the
house and doing so in a way that would protect it against vulnera-
bility of many of these homes to natural hazards.53 However, it is
difficult to see how such a solution would capture other spillover
effects of building subpar housing in neighborhoods lacking basic
infrastructure. These effects include higher levels of consumption
of urban resources (water, infrastructure, etc) as well as environ-
mental health risks, including the prevalence of various diseases,
which can spread to the rest of the city's population. These costs
and spillovers are even more difficult to internalize by stabilizing
private property rights in individual plots. 4
So too could a private property solution recapture the public
costs of upgrading of the neighborhood's infrastructure and ser-
vices, a cost that is two to three times the cost of providing infra-
51. See Sinden, supra note 44, at 559 (explaining that this is because the scope of
externality is more often physically, and not legally, determined).
52. Id at. 557-58 (finding the commons problem stems solely from the fact that one
user's consumption of a unit of the resource diminishes the amount available to
others). In that case, the tragedy may be solved by dividing the resource into parcels
of property that are smaller than the scope of the original externality. Once the legal
arrangement is changed by the delineation of property boundaries, the scope of the
impact caused by grass consumption shrinks to the size of each private parcel and the
externalities are internalized. Id.
53. D. Echeverry, Providing Housing in a Developing Country: Sustainability
Issues in the Colombian Case, 5-6, Paper presented at the First International
Construction Specialty Conference (May 23-26, 2006) (arguing many of these homes
are built in areas subject to flooding, landslides or other natural hazards and are not
built up to building codes which would protect them from these risks). "Just in
Bogota, it is estimated that close to ten thousand families live in areas considered of
intolerable risk." Id.
54. Ferguson & Navarrete, supra note 14, at 203.
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structure at the outset to a new formal sector development. 5 The
ability to recapture this cost is dependent upon the ability of pri-
vate property rights to be able to bear her share of this cost via her
property value (or more particularly, the government's tax on that
value). As we have seen, however, this will be difficult in large
part because the nature of the externalities not only exceed the
property boundaries but they reinforce (and even spill into) each
other. That is, the effect of building on the periphery creates nega-
tive health and environmental risks to the local and metropolitan
population, which then in turn give rise to the difficulty of col-
lateralizing the individual properties. As a result, the externali-
ties remain and the tragedy persists.
2. The Market Solution
The other form of privatization that might reduce the incen-
tives for overconsumption (or exploitation) of urban land and com-
mon resources is to create or mimic some form of Coasian
bargaining in which transaction costs are reduced, eliminated, or
minimized so that parties affected by the externalities will bar-
gain to reach the optimal level of resource use.16 This type of solu-
tion can be seen in Bogota's Metrovivienda, an agency designed to
answer the demand for low income housing in part by competing
against the informal market by offsetting the informal supply of
developable land. 7 Acting as a land bank, the government
acquires (through purchase) or assembles (through eminent
domain) land on the periphery, retrofitting it with infrastructure,
parceling it, and then selling it to developers for construction of
affordable housing units. By doing so, the government is both low-
ering (if not eliminating) the high transaction costs of developing
affordable housing in a legal fashion and creating additional cer-
tainty about the negotiated prices of the sale since the cost of the
externalities are already reflected in the price.58 It also avoids
55. Id.
56. In the context of the Hardin's original tragedy scenario, this might mean that
the cattle herders each be given a "right to graze," that each would have perfect
information about the dollar amount of the harm caused by their individual grazing,
and the cost to each herder of refraining from grazing. Further, it would mean that
"all of those harmed and benefited by the [grazing] can be identified and located
without cost, that bargaining is costless, and that the bargaining process is not
marred by collective action problems or strategic behavior") Sinden, supra note 44, at
561-63.
57. See generally Metrovivienda Home Page, http://www.metrovivienda.gov.co/
portel/libreria/php/decide.php?patron=01.01 (last visited March 3, 2009).
58. First, Metrovivienda buys large tracts of land that are zoned as rural or semi-
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over-fragmentation of the land, which is inefficient, and avoids the
more expensive task of retrofitting the land after its
development. 9
Metrovivienda has had some success at reducing the supply of
available land for informal settlements, at reducing the cost of
urbanized land, and at increasing the production of legal, afforda-
ble and good quality housing."0 However, it has had less reported
success in creating housing for the very poor. Part of this is
because it is difficult to control the behavior of the developers who
build the affordable housing and the lenders who fund it. Because
this market model does not bring to the bargaining table the low-
income potential homeowners, it may fail to optimally spread the
benefits from lower transaction costs to potential homeowners,
further incentivizing them to seek out lower-cost housing in illegal
settlements. In other words, "[w]ithout careful controls and appro-
priate incentives in place, developers (and other supply agents
including financial institutions and landowners) will absorb a
greater share of the subsidy amount than if the subvention went
in the form of a voucher (an upfront grant or "direct demand sub-
sidy") to households that the families could use to shop among eli-
gible housing units."6'
C. Collective Action in the Commons
The choice between private property rights and government
rural. The organization has thoroughly studied and identified the major raw land
parcels left in the Bogotd metropolitan area. Once the decision is made to purchase a
particular parcel, Metrovivienda contracts the local real estate appraisers
organization to determine a fair market price, declares the property of "public use,"
and initiates negotiations with the owner.... If the land owner is intransigent,
Metrovivienda uses its condemnation powers to expropriate the land and pays the
owner a fair market price set by legal fiat. In conjunction with land acquisition,
Metrovivienda applies to and obtains permits from other government entities for
development. The organization then puts in place trunk infrastructure and
establishes parks and other common areas in conjunction with other
authorities .... With infrastructure in place, Metrovivienda sells parcels to for-profit
and non-profit builders, who commit to construct and sell housing at a maximum
price. The builders first construct sample units to market their future developments.
The subsequent competition for clients among these builders, and the sale price
ceilings set by Metrovivienda, join to control sale prices and ensure quality. Thus,
builders pass on to homebuyers a substantial share of the great cost advantages
created by Metrovivienda, which results from lower-land purchase costs and larger-
scale and quicker development times. Ferguson & Navarrete, supra note 14, at 207.
59. Ruiz, supra note 6, at 192.
60. Id. at 192-94.
61. Ferguson & Navarrete, supra note 14 at 208 (pointing out why the Bogota
government has been thinking about reconsidering its role as merely a land bank and
proposing to directly grant financial assistance directly to families).
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coercion is built upon a core assumption: that collective action,
involving a group of individuals working to further their common
interests, is unlikely in light of the free rider problem.2 Elinor
Ostrom has famously questioned the assumption that collective
action is improbable or impossible for managing common pool
resources by citing examples of self-organized, cooperative man-
agement of natural resources where users devise and enforce their
own rules, even in situations where the temptation to free ride
exists.' In particular, she found that many tribal groups, villages
and other local communities had long histories of effective collec-
tive action, including in situations where they lacked any formal
mechanisms to control individual behaviors through a system of
property rights or government regulation. Thus, a third option for
managing common resources is a regime in which a community
self-manages or assumes a greater role in governing those
resources in sustainable ways.
Some would argue that the current landscape of highly-func-
tional, physically-stable settled communities among the urban
periphery is evidence that collective action results in effective
management of the commons. That is, these settlements demon-
strate that the poor are able to organize themselves in order to
incrementally build a livable environment in peripheral areas,
securing for themselves adequate infrastructure and eventually
acquiring legal status.' Stories like these from the neighborhood
of Juan XXIII are not uncommon:
The community started to organize themselves to provide
open rain systems and a sewage collector. They acquired
illegal connections from the city's power and water system
which was provided to the formal high income-neighbor-
hoods surrounding them. The land was occupied according
to the families' needs. The houses were built incrementally
and were allocated according to topographic characteristics
of the terrain. Some of the Juan XXIII male population
worked in the construction sector, and they acquired some
of the modern skills to build their own houses with better
materials such as brick and concrete.
In the 1970s, community organizations that had emerged
62. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 1965) (arguing that "unless
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interests").
63. OsTRoM, supra note 37.
64. Ruiz, supra note 6, at 197; see also Larson, Informality, supra note 4, at 140.
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during the self-help construction process evolved to provide
different kinds of services. Bavaria (the main Beer Com-
pany in Colombia) created a wooden box repair factory
along with the community. There was a daycare center, a
playground, a community house, a temporary market, and
a sport area created by the community. 5
It is astonishing how, in the absence of a formal planning
function or capacity, many of these settlements come to resemble
other, formally planned "legal" neighborhoods with stable prop-
erty regimes. They do so through the type of collective action gen-
erated by a close-knit community of "mutually vulnerable actors"
who possess (or develop) norms of reciprocity and an internal pri-
vate ordering which regulates asset and resource distribution.6
Of course there are high transaction costs to collective action
which many groups will not be able to overcome. And self-regula-
tion through collective action may do no better a job of internal-
izing the negative spillover effects to the larger metropolitan
population than do private property or market solutions. How-
ever, where collective action does evolve, as the account above and
others" suggest, these informal communities are able to self-regu-
late by developing norms different from those of the state legal
ordering and do not depend upon the state for their developing.
The question that remains is what should be the relationship,
or dynamic, between the self-regulating community and the for-
mal legal system. There are at least two models that fall along the
public-private spectrum of approaches that government might
take in response to the ability of a community to overcome collec-
tive action problems. The first, as we have seen, are the type of
regularization programs that already exist throughout the devel-
oping world which seek to integrate the fruits of collective action
into the existing legal order by upgrading the community's infra-
structure to the level it would be had government built the com-
65. Ruiz, supra note 6, at 195.
66. See generally Sara Singleton & Michael Taylor, Common Property, Collective
Action and Community, 7 J. THEORETICAL POL. 309 (1992), available at http://jtp.
sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/4/3/309.pdf (finding that a group possesses the capacities for
a wholly endogenous solution to the tragedy of commons to the degree it approximates
a community mutually vulnerable actors). But cf. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOuT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DIsPUTEs (Harvard Press ed., 1991) (arguing
that law is not always necessary so long as there is an agreement on social norms and
a private ordering which can supplant laws and operate more efficiently than legal
attempts to secure property rights).
67. See generally Bonilla, supra note 7.
68. Id.
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munity. In the process, the government also harmonizes the
regulatory norms in the community with its own, in effect bring-
ing the commons back into its formal regulatory system. As dis-
cussed before, the government can recapture these costs,
theoretically, by formalizing property rights in individual
homeowners.
Another, similar approach might seek to leverage the existing
community's collective action and social capital by formally facili-
tating or enabling its efforts to self-manage their neighborhood
commons. This type of solution might resemble the Business
Improvement Districts (BIDs) increasingly popular in the metro-
politan cities in the United States. A majority of business owners
vote to form a BID, agree to pay special assessments, and assume
(at least partial) control and management (maintenance) of their
neighborhood commons. American commentators have suggested
ways to extend the BID model to residential property owners, par-
ticularly for inner city neighborhoods whose commons is arguably
terribly under-regulated (e.g. under provisions of collective ameni-
ties and goods, inability to control crime), which would allow
urban property owners to consolidate their properties, pay fees,
and manage collective neighborhood goods (like streets, parks,
and traditional public services) in inner city neighborhoods. 9
The privatization of the neighborhood commons is problem-
atic in the American context in large part because it creates effec-
tive private rights in the neighborhood commons only for property
owners and not renters, the majority of inner city populations,
who have tremendous stakes and social capital invested in these
neighborhoods, would be completely disenfranchised by such pro-
posals. ° In informal settlements, however, the majority (if not the
69. A similar proposal would create Block Improvement Districts (BLIDs), which
would be formed by a supermajority of property owners who would pay fees and
provide and manage block level collective goods. See Robert Ellickson, New
Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DuKE L.J. 75, 109-10 (1998); Robert H. Nelson,
Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective
Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 827, 833-39 (1999).
70. The reasons given for limiting governance of BLIDs to property owners suffers
from a couple of important flaws. First, rationales for limiting governance to property
owners assume that only owners have long term investments in their neighborhoods
and that only monetary investments should count. Moreover, such rationales
erroneously assume that tenants (unlike property owners) have relatively easy/cheap
"exit" from neighborhood .... In my view, these rationales tend to overstate the
investment that property owners have in the commons and understate the
investment that non-property owning residents have in the commons. For example,
as I have written elsewhere, there are human and social capital costs and benefits
that residents accrue over time and that give them important long term stakes in the
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entirety in most cases) are owner-occupied and thus avoid this
problem. However, these owner-occupiers are also less able to pay
the assessments and fees necessary to provide for and manage
common pool goods because of the low valuation of their properties
on the market.
The community's collective action might be more appropri-
ately leveraged through public-private partnerships in which gov-
ernment provides initial support and investment of neighborhood
amenities-infrastructure, communal facilities, parks and open
space, etc.-and then allows the community to take charge and
continue the work on its own and through partnerships with vari-
ous government agencies. An innovative type of upgrading pro-
gram in Medellin, Colombia called Programa Integral de
Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnormales en Medellin ("PRIMED")
followed this idea. PRIMED sought to upgrade informal settle-
ments by generating and building on a culture of partnership in
which the government made initial investments in physical
improvements, housing conditions and tenure, and other collective
amenities and fostered community ownership of the process so the
community continued the work on its own.71 The "methodology of
partnership with the community" was designed in part to lead
toward a "comprehensive partnership of sustained development"
in which "momentum had to be built and taken advantage of for
further actions. The community had to gain ownership over the
process, multiply the effects of interventions, and continue the
effort through the institutions generated or strengthened and the
education delivered" 2
PRIMED's success over the years is a mixed story. On the one
hand, upgrading projects under the responsibility of government
institutions and citywide NGOs were largely a success. In con-
trast, smaller projects sponsored by local community organiza-
tions and financed at the 75% level were far less successful, partly
due to the high transaction costs to fully participating in this type
commons. This long term stake prevents the type of easy exit commentators invoke to
justify excluding them from non regulatory commons management solutions.
See Sheila Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land
Use, 82 NOTRE DAzm L. REV. 527, 577-78 (2006).
71. See Betancur, supra note 46, at 5.
72. As one scholar says about the thinking behind PRIMED, "the agency was
convinced that if the community did not gain ownership, the program could not
achieve its intended and more intangible goals" and would not have much of an
impact on the local fabric; namely, the insertion of the area into the city, trust in
government, its institutions, the rule of law, and continuation of the work. Id.
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of public-private partnership. 73 Specifically, PRIMED argued that
the failure of self-managed community projects was due in large
part to the lack of experience of local organizations in complying
with all the technical requirements involved and in managing the
projects within the established stipulations, along with the inabil-
ity of PRIMED to lend the community technical assistance.74
It may be that a program that invested more government
resources in boosting the community's capacity for self-governance
would have made the goal of a comprehensive public-private part-
nership more realistic. Regardless, there are clear costs to a gov-
ernmental program which seeks to enable, or facilitate, the
collective efforts of a community with even healthy amounts of
social capital, which these settlement communities have. These
are costs that the government either should be prepared to pay
(such as training costs) or acknowledge as serious barriers to pub-
lic-private management of collective or common urban resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay raises, but certainly does not answer, some of the
difficult problems associated with, and governance choices
presented by, the proliferation of informal settlements throughout
much of the urbanizing developing world. What this essay contrib-
utes to the discussion is a framework in which to think through
these choices. The tragedy of the commons choice between priva-
tization and coercive government regulation has some purchase,
this essay argues, in thinking about governing choices in this con-
text. Both the problems and governance choices presented by
informal settlements will vary across regions, to be sure, because
of the variation in political, economic, and legal systems. Latin
American cities, with which I am most familiar, tend to be rela-
tively developed (or developing) in ways that allow us to think
through the tragic results and choices presented by these settle-
ments. In many ways the questions presented here that pertain
to governing informal settlements extend to other types of urban
commons resources. In future work I hope to explore how this
framework might be applicable to and useful for thinking through
other urban commons dilemmas.
73. Id. at 8 (citing fact that sixty small projects were proposed but only eighteen
were funded and completed).
74. Id. at 8-9.
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